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THE SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE POWER
OF ALIENATION.
SouRc~s

his N:A'l'URE AND
oF LAW, John Chipman Gray says,
I N,"The
Common Law has often been reproached with the lack of
precision and certainty in its definitions, 'but, in truth, it is a great
advantage of the Common Law, and of the mode of its development
by judicial decision, that its definitions are never the matt.ers resolved by the cases; they are never anything but dicta. If at the
end of the sixteenth, or of the ~eventeenth, or even of the eighteenth ·
century, there had been definitions binding by statute op, the Courts;
if the meaning of 'contract', and 'malice', and ·'possession', and 'perpetuities' had been fixed, what fetters would have been imposed on
the natural development of the Law. And it is the great disadvantage of a code, that practising lawyers and jurists alike are hampered
by the cast-iron classification and definitions of a former generation,
which, in the advancement of legal thought and knowledge, are now
felt to be imperfect and im:~dequate." 1 Confining the illustration to
the word 'perpetuities' the above quotation is so apt to the purpose
of this article that it may well serve as a text for it.
By statute adopted in 1828, taking effect in 1830, New York attempted a legislative definition of perpetuity.2 This definition has
been adopted, directly or remotely, in whole or in part, by many other
states.3 It was a pr~ature attempt at definition, ~d it is intended
GRAY, Tm: NA~ A~ SoURhs oF 1'H£ LAw, Ch. I, Sec. 16.
• R. S., pt. 2, c. l, tit. 2, Secs. 14, 15, and 16.
,
• Arizona-Rsv. STS. OF 1913, CIVIJ, Cont, Secs. 467g-4681 ..
Califomia-CIVIJ, Cont, Secs. 715, 716, 772.
Idaho-I REv. Conts, Secs. 3o67, 3072.

1
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here to point out some of the anomalies and inconsistencies which
have resulted from it.
Professor Gray states the Rule again Perpetuities as follows: "No
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twentyone years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."'
Independent of statutory modification this would now generally be
conceded as an accurate general statement of the rule. 11 From this
it appears that only non-vested interests can come within the prohibition of the rule. All present interests are vested. Accordingly
neither present estates, nor vested future estates ever come within
the operation of the Rule against Perpetuities, whether alienable or
inalienable.a
Serious question has, however, been raised as to whether 'or not
all future non-vested, or contii:tgent interests, are subject to the rule,
it being contended that no alienable interest, even though future and
contingent, is within the policy that the·rule is intended.to subseive~7
Indiana~ BuRNS' ANN. STs., Sec. 3998.
Iowa-Com: o:it 1897, Sec. 2901.
Kentucky-I KY. STS. (1915), Sec. 236o.
Michigan-Hown.L's STs. [2nd ed.], Secs. 1o636-1o638.
Mfonesota-Gr:N-. STs. (1913), Secs. 6664-6666.
North Dakota-CoMPII.W LAWS (1913), Secs. 5287, 5315.
Oklahoma-R:i;:v. LAWS (I9Io), Secs. 66o5, 66o8.
South Dakota-2 CoMPILJ>D LAWS (I9I3), CIVIL Conr:, Secs. 224, 2.52.
Wisconsin-WIS. STs., Secs. 2038-2040.
Statutes relating to accumulations and statutes relating to personal property only are not included in the above references.
•GRAY, Rur.:i;: AGAINST Pr:RP:i;:TUITI:i;:s, [3rd ed.], Sec. 20I.
•London & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562; In re Trustees of
Hollis' Hospital, L. R. [1899], .2 Ch. 540; In re Ashforth, L. R. [19051, I Ch.
535; Matter of Wilcox, 194 ~. Y. 288, 296; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362;
SANDERS, Usr:s AND TRusTS, [4th ed.], Vol. I, p. Ig6; Lr:wxs, P:i;:RPr:TmTxr:s,
pp. 163, I64- See, however, CHAU.IS, RF.AI. PRoPF.RTY, [3rd ed.], p. 18o. Also
KAI.r:s, "PRom.Dfs o'it GRAv's. Rur.r: AGAINST Pr:RPttUITxr:s," 20 HARV. L. Rr:v.
I~I·
•Gray points out in his perpetuities, (3rd ed., Secs. 234-236), that some
American cases are not in strict accord with the statement above made, but
they are not in ·harmony with either, the weight of authority, or fundamental
theory.
.
.
• ~s, ~ PRoPeRTY, Vol. II, Secs. 956-g59; Fowu:R, PF.RSONAL
PROPERTY LAW oF TH:i;: STAtt OF Nr:w YoRK, [2nd ed.], pp. 329-331; FoWLr:R,
~ PRoPr:RTY LAw OF Tm: STATr: o:it Nr:w You:, [3rd ed.], pp. 270-276.

SUSPENSION OF POWER OF ALIENATION

237

'this has been approved and acted upon in decision.8 Even Professor Gray, though arguing for the reasonableness of the extension of
the rule tq futu~e contingent alienable interests, said, "Since the
original purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities was to restrain
one mode of tying up estates, it would not have been inconsistent
with that purpose to have held that contingent interests, if alienable,
did not come within the Rule, but, as will appear in this chapter,
the Rule has been extended so as to cover all futur,e interests whether
alienable or not, and this extension, though not a logically necessary
consequence of the establishment of the rule, is now well settled, and
it· is a reasonable extension."0 The decisions referred to have been
overruled,1° and it is believed·that this is "a logically necessary consequence" of the policy directing the establishment of the rule.
Let us examine that policy for a moment. Professor Gray has
said, as others have said, "The policy of the law is that property
should not he taken out o.f commerce." 11 Unfortunately this tells
us little. The word 'commerce' as used in connection with chattels
personal ordinarily implies both the exchange in legal rights and the
physical transportation of the chattels. The latter sense is that which
is stressed when the desirability of commerce is urged. But physical transportation of the subject matter of property in land can
occur if at all only within insignificant limits. The only 'commerce'
of any extent that can occur in connection with such property consists in the ex~hange of legal rights. And since it is in connection
with interests in land that the Rule against Perpe_tuities, though
applicable to chattels personal, is most frequently applied, it is the
•See cases referred to and discussed in GRAy's PERPtTUIT!ES, [3rd ed.],
Ch. VII.
9
GRAY, Ruu: AGAINST PSRPtTUITits, [3rd ed.], Sec. 268. See also Sec.
278 where he says, "To subject future contingent interests presently alienable
to the Rule against Perpetuities is an extension of the Rule beyond the needs
which gave.it birth." However, in an article entitled, "Remoteness of Charitable Gifts,'' 7 HARV. L. R.mr. 406, 410, he answers the following question in
favor of the second alternative, "Is a remote future interest objectionable only
· because for too long a period there may be no one who can give a good title;
or is it objectionable also because the policy of the law does not allow interests so uncertain in value to hamper a present ownership?" See also Ruu:
AGAINST PtRPimJ1ms, [3rd ed.], Sec. 6o3 £.
10
GRAY, Ruu~ AGAINST PSRPt>rUITits, [3rd ed.], Secs. 275-277.
11
Ruu: AGAINST ~1ms, [3rd ed.], Sec. 6oaa.
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desirability of commerce in property in land that has been in the
minds of those engaged in working out the Rule.
The Rule against -Perpetuities is a rule of policy founded uponsome supposed public benefit justifying, in the cases coming within
its scope, the thwarting of an individual desire. What public benefit
can result from the exchange of legal rights or interests in land?
Undoubtedly the chief benefit consists in the resulting greater utilization of the subject matter of such property.12 What cbnditions are
essential to the procuring of a high degree of utilization of land?
Certainly one essential condition is possession by one whose tenure
is reasonably free from hazards beyond his control. Efficient use
of land may require a permanent investment of capital which will
not be made by one who is uncertain of his tenure. Another essential condition is the ability of the possessor to place another with
like permanency of tenure on the land in his stead. For many
reasons it may be impossible for the one in possession of land to be
able to use it to advantage. In order that such land may be used
to capacity, he should be able to dispose of it to another who can.
In other words, to secure a high degree of utilization of land, it
should be possessed by those having an assured interest with freedom to use at their discretion coupled with the power to convey to
others a like interest. This ideal the law has with rare exception
attemped to secure.
This condition may be, however, by no means desirable in the
view of the creator or grantor of the estate in possession. For
various reasons he may wish to impose his will upon the possessor
in such a way as to lessen the security of his possession, and to restrict his freedom of use and disposition. The law has refused to
permit him to do this except by the creation of a future interest in
some form.13 The power to create future interests of certain kinds
having been recognized in the creator and grantors of estates in
12

There are possible social interests to be furthered by such freedom of
alienation, such as securing a wider distribution of the ownership of land,
but it is ·believed that such interests have had, as compared with those referred to in the text, relatively little influence upon the development of
the Rule.
13
Exceptions to the statement· of the text exist in the case of the separate
estates of married women, and in the case of spendthrift trusts where
recognized.
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p9ssession, the question becomes, what limitations will be placed
the power in the interest of the ideal referred to above?
The limitations eventually imposed were the rules against re-·
straints ~n alienation arid th~ Rule against Perpetuities.u The rules·
against restraints an alienation and the Rule against Perpetuities
alike operate by declaring void future interests because of their
tendency to inter£ere with the freedom of the owner of the estate
in possession. The former are directed against future interests, the
object of whose creation is the prevention of the exercise by· the
o~ner of the preceding estate of his power of alienation.111 The Rule
against Perpetuities is directed against future interests without regard to the object of their creation. But its object is, as is the object
of the rules against restraints on alienation, to promote the utilization of land by offering security in possession and freedom of use
and disposition, to the ow~er of the present estate.
A brief review of the course of decision will show the relationship
between the rules against restraints on· alienation and the Rule
against Peryetuities. By the fifteenth century at least it had been
held that a condition or limitation intended to restrain the alienation
of a fee .simple by the owner of it was void.16 At about the same
time the courts were seeking to remove the restrictions placed on the
owner of the present estate by the Statute De Donis. They eventually held that the tenant in tail could bar the heirs tail and the reversioners and remaindermen of the rights guaranteed them by De
Donis by suffering a common recovery.17 When it _had once been
held that an entail could be disentailed in a certain manner, conditions against disentailing in that manner began to be imposed upon
grants of such estates. Though conditions against alienation of fees
tail had been sustained previously as in accord with the policy of
De Donis, when the policy of that statute was reversed by the courts
upo~

[3rd ed.], Sec. 603a.
The r-ules against restraints on alienation are, of course, wider in their
scope than is here indicated. They operate to render void direct attempts by
the grantors of estates to render them inalienable by withholding from the
· grantees the powers of alienation they would otherwise have, as well as indirect attempts to accomplish the same result by imposing a gift over in the
form of a future interest to a third person as a penalty. It is the latter effect
of such rules that is referred to in the text.
,..GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, [2nd ed.], Sec. 19.
•t DIGBY, HISTORY OF THE ·LAW OF fuAI. PROPERTY, [5th ~d.], pp. 249-258..
"GRAY, RULE AGAINST I'tRPETUITIES,
11
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by the approval of disentailing devices in the form of fines and
common recoveries the courts began to frown upon efforts of
creators of estates to create unbarrable entails. Accordingly condi.tions against suffering a common recovery or levying a fine were
declared void.18 Such conditions were called perpetuities, and tl>
them the word perpetuity owes one of its first applications in
our law.19
Such conditions are restraints on alienation in the modem sense.
In applying the word 'perpetuities' to them, emphasis is undoubtedly
placed upon the condition which would result if they were sustained,
and if they should accomplish their purpose. This result would be to
secure a fixed devolution of the property regardless of the wishes
of the successive owners subsequent to the creator of the estate tail.
That fixed devolution was undoubtedly in the minds of the courts
when they used the term 'perpetuity.' But the reason they objected
to this fixed devolution was for the same reason that they objected to
other conditions or limitations restrairiing the alienation of estates
in land, i. e. their tendency to interfere with use and disposition by
the owner of the estate in possession.
At about the same time this attempt to revive the unbarrable entail
was being frustrated, there was tried the expedient of creating particular estates for life in the first taker with remainder in tail. Since
these remainders were usually to unborn persons, they were usually
contingent. Because contingent common law remainders were destructible by the owner of the estate in possession, the life estate and
remainders were created in use to be executed by the Statute of Uses
in hopes that contingent remainders so created would be held indestructible. This device was also called a perpetuity.20
It was held, however, that even though created through the operation of the Statute of Uses, contingent remainders were destructible
by the life tenant. 21 Hence this device proved unsuccessful. Not,
it will be noted, by declaring the future interest void in the first instance, but by subjecting it to the control of the owner of the estate
in possession.
18

I Co. 83b; BACON, Uss ol? 'rHE LAW, Law Tracts, 145;
Rss'rRAIN'rS ON AL!ENA'rION, [2nd ed.], Secs. 75-77; GRAY, Ruu: AGAJnS'r
P$PE'tUI'rlES, [3rd ed.], Secs. 141a-141c.
"GRAY, Rur.E AGAINS'r PERPE'rUI'r!ES, {3rd ed.], Sec. 141e.
11
GRAY, Rur.i;: AGAINST PERPETUITIES, [3rd ed.], Sec. 141c.

Corbet's Case,

GRAY,

"'Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a.
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But while contingent remainders even though created by way of
use had been held to be destructible, it was shortly held that springing and shifting uses and executory devises were not destructible by
act of the ··owner of th.e estate in possession.22 Here, then, were
interests .that obviously should be controlled in some way. The
method of control was eventually laid down by Lord Nottingham in
the Duke of Norfolk's Case.23 It was that springing and shifting
uses, and executory devises must be so limited that the contingency
upon which they were limited must occur within ·a time which was
not so remote as to cause any inconvenience. The inconvenience
meant is undoubtedly that of the owner of the estate in possession,
or perhaps, rather, through him, that of the public, for Lord Nottingham, when asked where he would stop in permitting these interests to be limited in the future, answered that he would stop when
any visible inconvenience occurred, where there was any danger of
a 'perpetuity.' Naturally. enough, however, he did not use 'perpetuity' in the modern sense of a future interest which may not vest
within the time permitted by the rule. 24 The definition in this sense
presupposes the existence of the Rule. But Lord Nottingham was
using the term 'perpetuity' in the sense, or in one of the senses, in
which it had previously been used. He said : "A perpetuity is the
settlement of an estate or an interest in tail, with such remainders
expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power of the tenant in tail
in possession, to dock by any recovery or assignment, but such remainders must continue as perpetual clogs upon the estate."25 The
sense in which he used the term 'perpetuity' shows that he had in
mind in formulating his Rule against Perpetuities the inconvenience
in permitting to exist for too long a time an indestructible interest.
Since the rule as so developed is limited to regulating future interests according to their remoteness of vesting it might appropriately have been called the Rule against Remoteness of Vesting. 20
For the same reason, however, that the devices previously ref erred
to were called 'perpetuities', i. e. that they procured or attempted to
'"Manning's Case, 8 Co. 94b; Lampet's Case,
Cro. Jae. 590•
... 3 Ch. Cas. I •

IO

Co. 46b; Pelis v. Brown,

.. LEWIS, ~TUITY, 164-

.. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. I.
"'GRAY, Rur,E AGAINST PERP£TU1ms, [3rd ed.], Sec. 2; JARMAN, Wn.I.s,
[7th ed.], Vol. I, p. 296, note v.
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procure a fi...xed devolution of property, it was called the Rule against
Perpetuities. But, since an attempt to create a 'perpetuity' may be
controlled by oth~r rules as well as by, or instead of, the Rule against
Perpetuities, confusion with such rules has been caused by the use
of the phrase 'Rule against Perpetuities'.
Thus there should never have been any doubt but that the application of the rule was not affected by the alienability of the future interest. An alienable future interest is only slightly less objectionable
from the point of view of the owner of the present estate than an
inalienable one. This has always been recognized in the application
of the. rules against restraints on alienation. Thus, in case a grant
is made to A and his heirs, but in case he or they should attempt to
alien the estate, then to B and his heirs, the gift to B is none the less
void as an improper restraint on alienation though B can convey his
Interest, or though A and B can jointly convey an estate in possession
free from a future interest. The law h31s very sensibly placed less
importance upon the fact that they can alienate than upon the fact
that they probably will not. Of course, it is the latter fact that is
relied upon to make the device effective. Yet doubt has been entertained as to whether an alienable future interest comes within the
operation of the Rule against Perpetuities. It is believed that that
doubt would have been much less apt to arise had the rule been called
from the beginning the Rule against Remoteness of Vesting. 21
Also had it ·been called the Rule against Remoteness of Vesting
there could never have arisen any question of its application to present estates. As it is, it has sometimes mistakenly been applied to
such interests.28
Had it been so called, it is clear that the revisors of the New York
statutes would have framed their definition very differently, fol',
although it is now said that the rule against suspension of the power
of alienation now appearing in the statutes of New York and of the
states which have adopted the definition of those statutes is very
rr "It ought to have been called the Rule again Remoteness; in the old
books 'perpetuity' means an inalienable interest and (more especially) a disposition by which land is settled on unborn descendents ad infinitum, so as
to be inalienable. The two id'eas of 'remoteness' and 'perpetuity' are constantly confused at the present day." Charles Sweet: "The Monstrous Regiment of the Rule against Perpetuities," 18 JURIDICAL Rtvn:w, 132, n. (a).
28
GRAY, Rur.E AGAINST PJUU>in'UI'l'ml>, [3rd ed.]; Secs. 234-246.
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di.fferent from the common law Rule against Perpetuities,20 there is
no reason to suppose that the revisors intended to alter the fundamentals of that rule. 30
They submitted to the I~gislature, in the first instance, certain
sections as follows :
Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation,
which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a
longer period than is prescribed in this Article. Such power
of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in
being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.
Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer
period than during the continuance and until the termination
of a life, or lives in being at the creation of the estate, except
in the.single case mentioned in the next section.
Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on
a prior remainder in fee to take effect in the event that the
persons to whom the first remainder is limited, shall die under
the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency,
by which the estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their age.
Sec. 17. In every creation of a future estate, the absolute
power of alienation shall not be suspended longer than the
lives of two persons then in being.
Sec. 18. Successive estates for life shall not be limited
unless to persons in being at the creation thereof; and where
a remainder shall be limited on more than two successive
estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the
two persons first entitled thereto, shall be void, and upon the
"Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 296.
.. The object of the revisers is thus stated by themselves, "It is to abolish
all technical rules and distinctions, having no relation to the essential nature
of property and the means of its beneficial enjoyment, but which, derived
from the feudal system, rest solely upon feudal reasons; to define with precision the limits within which the power of alienation may be suspended by
the erection of contingent estates, and ·to reduce all expectant estates substantially to the same class, and apply to them the same rules whether created
by deed or devise." 3 N. Y. R. S. [2nd ed.], p. 571.
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death of .those persons, the remainaer shall take effect, in the
same manneras if no other life estates had been created.81
In th.eir notes to these sections the revisers said:
"The difference between the preceding sections and the
existing law, consists in the following particulars:
I. Alienafion can not be protracted by mere nominees unconnected with the estate, beyond the period of two lives.
2. No more than two successive estates for life can be
created.
3. The period of twenty-one years, after a life or lives in
being, is no 1onger allowed as an absolute term; but the rule
is restored to its original object, by being confined to the case
of actual infancy, which is directly provided for by rendering
the cdisposition defeasible, and allowing another to be substituted durin_g the_period." 32
~rom this it seems clear, as said before, that there was no inten·tion on the part of the revisers to change the fundamentals of the
;Rule against Perpetuities. How clearly they comprehended those
fundamentals is not certain, however. It is likely that they more or
less clearly conceived it as a rule against remoteness of vesting, but
failed to comprehend that an alienable· future interest is nearly if
not quite as obnoxious to the rule as an inalienable one. Thus
they say:

"To prevent a possible difficulty in the minds of those to
whom the subject is not familiar, we may also add, that an
estate is never inalienable, unless there is a contingent remainder, and the contingency has not yet occurred. Where
the remainder is vested, as where the lands are given to A for
life, remainder to B (a person then in being) in fee, there
is no suspense of the power of alienation; for the remainderman and the owner of the prior estate, by uniting, may always
convey the whole estate. This is the meaning of the rule of
law prohibiting per2etuities, and is the effect of the definition
in Sec. 14:"33
u See N. Y. R. S. [:znd ed.], p. 570.
12
3 N. Y. R S. [:znd. ed.], p. 572•
.. 3 N. Y. R. S. [2nd ed.], p. 573.
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. These sections were adopted by the legislature substantially as
proposed with the important exception that in section 15 the words
"of not more than two" were substituted for the words "and until
the termination of a life, ·or" so that the section as enacted read:
"The ab5olute power of alienation, shall not be suspended by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the
continuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of
the estate, except in the single case mentioned in tP,e next section" ;34
and section 17 was omitted. The change in section 15 was made at
the suggestion of the revisers and section 17 omitted on their further
suggestion that it would be rendered unnecessary by the correction
in section 15.35
The importance of these changes consists in this : Ha~ sections 14
and 15 been proposed in the form enacted it might plausibly have
been argued that section 15 did nothing more than prescribe the
period beyond which alienation might not be suspended while the
test of what constitutes a suspension was to be found in section 14.
Further it could be argued that tinder section 14 the only suspension
provided against is that caused by future estates.36
u IN: Y. R. S., p. 723, Sec. 15.
.. 3 N. Y. R. S. [2nd ed.], p. 570, Secs. IS and 17.
.. In 18g6 the Real property Law of the State of New York was subjected
to a new revision. In this revision sections 14 15, and 16 of Art. I. Tit..II,
Ch. I, Pt. II, of the Rms<:D STATUTES were consolidated so as to read as follows: "The absolute power of alienation is suspended, when there are no
persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.
Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the
absolute power of alienation, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of not more •than two lives in being
at the creation of the estate; except that a contingent remainder in fee may
be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the
persons to whom the first remainder is limited, die under the age of twentyone years, or on any other contingency by which the estate of such person
may be determined before they attain full age. For the purposes of this section, a minority is deemed a part of a life, and not an absolute term equal to
the possible duration of such minority." Sec. 32 of the RtAI, PRoPlffi'l'Y LAW
· oF 18¢, Sec. 32, Ch. XLVI, of G1m:ERAL LAws. In the report to the legislature of the Commissioners on· Statutory Revision who prepared this revision
it is said with reference to this section that it is sections 14, 15, and 16 "unchanged in substance, except that the last sentence, which is declaratory of
existing law, is new." FowL!lR's RtAL PROP!>R'l'Y LAW OF THE STAT!l OF NEW
YORK, [3rd ed.], p. 1209. Despite the statement that this. s~ction leaves the
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As will appear later this was actually argued and, had it not been
for prqof of the form in which the statutes were originally proposed,
the argument might have been successful.
Let us see what has been the course of decision. For the sake of
convenience, the discussion will cover, first, present interests; second, future interests.
To a proper understanding of the application of the legislation
previously quoted to present interests, it is necessary to. refer briefly
to the regulations provided in the New York Revised Statutes on
the subject of trusts.
The revisers in the rules submitted. regulating trusts were inspired
by the following considerations: They seemed to feel that much of
the complexity of .the law of real property and the uncertainty of
titles was caused by the separation of the legal and equitable
estates.37 They proposed a system which, in their words, "will sweep
away an immense mass of useless refinements and distinctions; will
relieve the law of real property to a great extent, from its abstruseness and uncertainty, and render it, as a system, intelligible and
consistent; that the security of creditors and purchasers will be increased; the investigation of titles much facilitated; the n~eans of
alienation be rendered far more simple and less expensive, and finally, that numerous sources of vexatious litigation will be perpetually
closed."38
They proposed to accomplish these results by abolishing passive
uses and trusts by more thoroughgoing legislation than the original
former sections unchanged in substance, had the original legislation been proposed and enacted in this form, it could hardly have been interpreted as
applying to any interests other than future estates, an interpretation, of course,
much narrower than was given to the sections as they were actually enacted.
See CHAPI.IN's SUSPENSION oit THE Powa OF .Al.ISNATION [2nd ed.], pp. 134,
135. FowLtt's REAL PROPERTY LAW oi,· THE STATE oF NEw YoRK, [3rd ed.],
pp. 262, II67. It, however, seems to be accepted by the courts as the commissioners evidently intended it to be. Herzog v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co.,
177 N. Y. 86, 69 N. E. 283; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Kip, 120 App. Div.
347, 104 N. Y. S. 1o92; Bindrim v. Ulrich, 64 App. Div. 444. 72 N. Y. S. 239;
Union Trust Co. v. Metcalf, 37 Misc. 672, 76 N. Y. S. 375; Allen v. Litchard,
93 Mis. 197, 157 N. Y. S. 19; In re Ward's Bsµte, 175 N. Y :S. 654; In re
Abbey, 168 N. Y. S. 1047, 181 App. Div. 395, affirming decree in 164 N. Y. S.
934, g8 Misc. 5o6.
81
Revisers' Reports and Notes, 3 N. Y. R. S., [2nd ed.], pp. 579-54
as Ibid, p. 584.
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Statute of Uses, and by allowing active trusts only within very narrow limits. The active trusts which they proposed to permit were
the following :
~' (I)

To sell land.s for the benefits of creditors.
( 2) To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of
legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon.
(3) To receive the rents and profits of land, and apply
them to the education and support, or support only of any
person during the life of such person or for any shorter terms,
subject to the rules prescribed in the first Article of the Title.
(4) To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to
accumulate the same, for the purposes and within the limits
prescribed in the first Article of this Title."39
Only the third class is of significance for the purposes of this discussion.40 The recommendation as to this class was adopted as proposed with the exception that the words "or support only" were
changed by the legislature to "or either." 41
Upon later recommendation by the revisers, the statute was
amended in 1830 by striking out the words "education and support,
or either-", and substituting the word "use".42 So that this provision
then stood, "To receive the rents and profits of lands, and apply them
to the use of any person, during the life of such person, or for any
shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in the first Article of
this Title." 43
It was undoubtedly the expectation of the revisers that the authority granted in this section would be exercised in general in the
creation of trusts for the benefit of incompetents.u With this
thought in mind they recommended, and the legislature enacted, the
two following sections :
.. Ibid, p. 579, note to Sec. 56.
.. The first two being trusts for alienation, a ·trust created under them
could be deemed in no view of the statutes against suspension of alienation,
to violate such statutes. Accumulations are regulated by provisions of the
statutes other than the general statutes against the suspension of the power
of alienation. I N. Y. R. S. 726, Secs. 37 and 38.
41
Revisers' Reports and riotes, 3 N. Y. R. S., [2nd ed.], p. 578.
••Ibid.
"IN. Y. R. S., [2nd ed.], p. 723, Sec. 55 (3).
"Revisers' Reports and Notes, 3 N. Y. RS., [2nd ed.], p. 585.
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"Sec. 63. No person beneficially interested in a trust for
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands can assign or in
any manner dispose of such interest; but the rights and interest of every person for whose benefit a trust for the payment of a sum in gross is created, are assignable.
Sec. 65. Where the trust shall be expressed in the instrument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance or other act
of the trustees, in contravention of the trust, shall be absolutely void."45
The interest of a beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of the rents
and profits of land is, under the first of these sections, made inalienable, even though not so intended by the creator of the trust. In
fact, the creator of a trust under this section can not give to the
cestui the power of alienation.4 a He may give to the trustee the
power to convey. Except as he does. give such power, however,
property held upon a trust for such purposes is completely inalienable.
Though, as stated, it was expected by the revisers that the trust
ordinarily to pe created under this section was a trust for incompetents, it was held that trusts for all persons competent or incompetent were permissible under it.47 We thus have a legislative command that aII trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of land
shall be what would now be called 'spendthrift' trusts, such command
long antedating the development of the modem spendthrift trust
doctrines. This legislation received a sympathetic consideration by
the courts. To such an extent was this true that it was held that the
rules there laid down should be applied by analogy to trusts for the
receipt of the income of personal property.48
The question of the application of the statutes against the suspension of the power of alienation to trusts of this character was the first
"FOWLER'S !O;AL PROPERTY LA.w OF THI> STATJ> OF Ni;:w YoRK, [3rd ed.],
p. 451. IN. Y. R. S., p. 730, Secs. 63 and 65 .
.. Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 333 ; Crooke v. Kings County, 97
N. Y. 421; CHAPI.IN, ExPRJ>ss TRUSTS AND PowERs, 379; 30 CYC. 1503, n. I.
Compare FoWLER, REA!, PROPJ;;RTY LAW oF '!'HJ> S'l'A'l'I> OF Ni;:w YoRK, [3rd
ed.], 500.
"Fow~'s REA!, PRoPMTY LAw oF Ni;:w YoRK, [3rd ed.], 450-451;
lh:sV1's, RJ,;AL PRoP$'l'Y, 497, 4g8; Liggett v. Perkins, 2 N. Y. 297, 3o8, 321, 325 .
.. Fowr.u's PERSONAL PRoPi;:RTY LAW OF Ni;:w YoRK, [2nd ed.], p. 52.
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question on the sections relating to real property in the New York
Revised Statutes that came before the courts. This was in the well
known case of Coster v. Lorillard.49 In this case a testator devised
certain real estate to trus~ees, consisting of a brother and twelve
nephews .and nieces, and to the survivor or survivors of them, in
trust to receive the rents and profits and apply them to the use of the
twelve nephews and nieces, in equal shares, during their joint lives,
and to the survivor or survivors of them so long as any· of them
should live, and to convey the remainder of the estate, after the
death of all of such nephews and nieces, in fee to such of their
descendents as should be then in existence. The will came before
Vice-Chancellor McCown of the first circuit for construction. He
held that, as to the trusts for the lives of the twelve nephews and
nieces, it was good even though inalienable, for the reason that the
statutes against suspension of the power of alienation applied only
to suspension caused by future estates.50 The reasoning by which
this result was reached was that previously suggested.u He declined to make any decree as to the ultimate limitation over, ·because
the proper parties were not before the court, but expressed the
opinion that they were void as being too remote.
On appeal to the court of chancery, all three of the revisers, Butler, Spencer, and Duer, appeared, each representing different interests. All contended that the devise for the lives of the twelve
nephews and nieces was not rendered invalid by the statutes against
suspension of the power of alienation; Butler,52 because such statutes
affected only future estates ;53 Spencer, because, even if applicable
to present interests, the restrictions on alienation in such cases as
this, if any there were, were imposed by law, "and if not legal, they
do not exist; and if legal, they must prevail" ; and because the "restriction is an incapacity in respect to the character of the party
which is not engrafted on the estate." 54 Duer, because the incapacity to assign the beneficial interest in a trust for the receipt of the
rents and profits and lands is personal and is not engrafted on the
estate, the· true construction of the statute being that the beneficial
., 5 Paige's Ch. 172, 14 Wend. 265.
00
5 Paige's Ch. 172, l87-1g6.
11
Supra, p. 249.
11
With whom was associated Peter A. Jay.
11
5 Paige's Ch. 172, 203-207.
"'5 Paige's Ch. 172, 208-299.
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interest is not per se assignable, ·but may be made assignable by the
testator, and that it had here been made assignable.55
"The Chancellor,56 however, held that the statutes applied to all
.inalienable interests, whether present or future, and from whatever
cause the inalienability arose. He held, however, that though the
trust for the benefit of the nephews and nieces was subject to the·
statutes, it was not void, as the trust, properly construed, created a
tenancy in common, and as to the individual interest of each, there
was not a suspension for a greater length of time than the statutes
permitted.57 To the argument of the Vice-Chancellor that they prohibited suspension by future estates only, he answered by showing
the consolidation of the proposed sections IS and I7, drawing thereirom the -conclusion that section IS should be construed as including
the "interests intended to be covered by the two proposed sections,
and in determining what interests were covered, he held as stated,
that all inalienable interests were.
.
On appeal to the "Court of Errors similar arguments were repeated
but the court held_that the estates created were joint estates, were
inalienable for more than the period permitted by the statutes, and
were void £or that reason.58
Since the decision in this case it has been consistently held that
trusl:s for the receipt of the rents and profits of land are subject to
·the statutory rules against the suspension of the power of atienation.59
Let us see what this means. The legislature has established the
rule that trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of 1and shall
be inalienable. Because of the inalienability which has thus been
.imposed upon the trust, it is declared to be void. Because of a
quality annexed to his gift which he probably did not contemplate,
.perhaps did not even desire, the wishes of the creator of the trust
are frustrated, his cestuis disappointed, and his property distributed
1111

5 Paige's Ch. r72, 2og-2r3 .
.. Walworth.
~ 5 Paige's Ch. r72, 2r3, 2x8.
1111
I4 Wend. 265.
'""Douglas v. Cruger, 8o N. Y. IS; Herzog v. Title Guarantee and Trust
Company, I77 N. Y. 86; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Kip, I92 N. Y. 266;
In re Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 650, 41 Pac. 772, 776; Casgrain v. Hammond, I34
Mich. 419, ¢ N. W. 510; Danforth v. Oshkosh, u9 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258;
Rong v. Haller, rog Minn. 191, 123 N. W. 471; Penfield v. Tower, I N. D. 216.
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among those whom he has indicated no desire to benefit. The law
has been- rather over sensitive to thwarting the intention of the·
creators o~ trusts. in the interests of the public, but if the legislature
ever consciously contempla~ed such a result as that here indicated,
it must be adjudged guilty of a wanton disregard of the intention of
the creators of trusts and of the rights of their intended cestuis.
The writer does not believe that the revisers or the legislature ever
contemplated any such result. He believes that. the revisers when
acting as counsel were not inconsistent with themselves as revisers
in arguing that the statutes did not require any such result. Had
tliey foreseen the judicial construction to be adopted, it seems inconceivable that they would have proposed any such legislation.
As to the application of the statutory rule to future interests. It
has been said repeatedly that the requirements of the statutory rule
are satisfied if all having interests may convey by joint or several
action in fee. simple.60 In 'other words, if each interest in the property in question is by itself alienable, there is no violation of the
statutory rule.
Let us see how this works out in a concrete case. Take the case
previously suggested. A grant is made of Blackacre to A and his
heirs, with a proviso that if he or his heirs should ever alienate or
attempt to alienate the same, it should go to B and his heirs. The
conditional limitation to B would be void under the common law
Rule against Perpet~ities because it might vest at a time later than
permitted by the rule. It would also be void in the jurisdictions
where the statutory nde against suspension of the power of alienation prevails because in violation of the mles against restraints on
alienation as an improper restraint on the alienability of A's interest. 61 But since A and B could by joint action at any time convey
a fee simple, in possession, there would be no violation of the statutes
against suspension of the power of alienation.
The object of the statutory rule is said to be to keep real property
00

.

Graham v. Graham, 49 Misc. (N. Y.) 4, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 779; Becker
v. Chester, II5 Wis. 90, 108, 91 N. W. 87; Buck v. Walker, n5 Minn. 239,
132 N. W. 205; Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 283, 82
N W.56.
1
• CHAPLIN, SusPtNSION OF THF: PowER oF ALIENATION, [2nd. ed.], Secs.
129, 130; Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 5o6, 512; Mandlebaum v. McDowell, 29
~fich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61; Van Osdell v. Champion, 8g Wis. 661; Zillmer v •
•andguth,. 94 Wis. 6o7.
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in the channels of co~erce. 62 So vigorous has been the legislative
mandate that this condition must prevail that we have seen that it
is effective to render void because of inalienability an interest which
had been rendered inalienable by another legislative mandate. Now
we find it so innocuous that it is not effective to render abortive an
attempt to ta.1ce propert)I'- out of the channels of commerce forever,
leaving the frustration of such attempts to be effected through the
operation of rules of policy worked out by the courts in their attempts to procure free a1ienability of property.
-The difficulty here seems to rest largely upon a too literal reading
of the statutory definition. It is true that Blackacre can be alienated
unconditionally and in fee, at any time by its present owners. It is
equally true that every probability is against its being alienated. B
will almost certainly retain the club he holds over A's head in the
form of his conditional limitation. It may be because he conceives
it his duty to stand guard; if not, the ci.rcumstances are such that he
will almost certainly demand more for a surrender of his rights than
A will be willing to pay. This of cours.e was understood by the
grantor in creating the limitation to B, and .by the judges when they
declared such a limitation void as an improper restraint on alienation.
In dealing with the statutory test of what constitutes an absolute
suspension of alienation, or in the words of the statute, a suspension
of the absolute power of alienation, the courts have proceeded as
though they were dealing with a statement of abstract truth rather
than with a rule of policy founded upon economic considerations.
They have been satisfied with a purely theoretical possibility of
alienation, and have not concerned themselves with the policy the
statute was intended to subserve. Had that policy been clearly perceived, it is believed that it would have been seen that it requires
free alienability by the owner or owners of the present estate and
02

"In respect to Rule I, concerning suspension of the absolute power of
alienation, the main purpose is to confine within specified limits the period
during which property may be so tied up that it can not come upon the market,
or cannot be freed from its special character as an 'estate' or 'fund' and restored to the status of ordinary _property owned outright by individuals who
can sell or spend it." CHAPLIN, SusPtNSION oF '.l'HE POWER oF AI.IF:NATION,
{2nd ed.], Sec. 21; "The primary purpose of the statute limiting the right to
alienate realty is not to prevent perpetuities, but to _prevent unduly removing
-property from the field of business transactions." Becker v. Chester, us
Wis. go. (Quotation from the syllabus by Marshall, J.)
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that the absolute power of alienation is suspended, when the owner
or owners of the present estate can not convey an absolute fee in
possession.
The courts are ·perhaps ~ot to be criticised too much for their interpretation of the statutes; for it was an interpretation to which
the definition of perpetuity upon which the statutes were framed
were subject. Even under the common law rule, it has been held at
times that the rule had no application to alienable future interests,
regardless of their remoteness. 63
This is due, as has been pointed out; to the fact that such definitions have been carried over from a time when 'perpetuity' was used
in the sense of an unbarrable entail. It was defined in this way by
Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk's Case,6 ' as previously
quoted : "A perpetuity is a settlement of an estate or interest in
tail, with such remainders e~pectant upon it, as are in no sort in
the power of the tenant in .tail in possession to dock by any recovery
or assignment." It was defined in the same sense in the slightly
earlier case of W asliboitrne v. D(Jwnes, 65 where, in determining that
a tenant o~ an equitable estate tail could bar the entail, it was said,
"A perpetuity is where, if all that have interest join, and yet can
not bar qr pass the estate. But if by the concurrence of all having
the estate tail may be barred, it is no perpetuity." Of course in referring here to "all that have interest" only those interested in the
present estate were intended to be referred to. Yet it has been
understood in the wider sense of including those having future as
well as those having present interests. Even Saunders, writing before the adoption of the New York Revision, so understood it, and
therefore insisted that it was wrong. 68 But unfortunately others
who understood it in the same sense failed to see t.liat, so understood,
it was wrong. Among these have been the interpreters . of the
statutes against suspension of the power of alienation. In general,
.. GRAY, Rux.t AGAINST Pt!!P£TUITI£S, Ch. VII.
"3 Ch. ·cas. I.
" l Ch. Cas. 213 •
.. He says: "It is said in the case of Washliourne v. Downes, l Cha. Ca.
23, 213, that, 'A perpetuity is where, if all that have interest join, yet they can
not bar or pass the estate;' and in the case of Scattergood v. Edge, I Salk.
229, that 'every executory devise is a perpetuity so far as it goes; i. e. an
estate inalienable though all mankind join in the conveyance.' But these
definitions of a perpetuity are not accurate. If an estate be limited to the
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it has been assumed by those interpreting those statutes that they
express the common law as it stood at the time they were first adopted, and that the common law was satisfied if all having interests
could convey. Thus in Becker v. Chester, Marshall, J., said, "Note
the complete harmony between the language of W ashboitrne v.
Downes and the statute: "A perpetuity is where, if all that have
interest join, and yet can not bar or pass the estate. But if by the
concurrence of all having the estate tail may be barred, it is no perpetuity." "Such power of alienation is suspended when there are no
persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be
conveyed."61
To the general view that the rule laid down by the New York
Revised Statutes is against suspension of alienation only, there was
among writers and courts little dissent prior to the year r89r. In
that year appeared a book by Mr. Stewart, CHAPLIN ON SusPENSION
oF THE PowER OF ALIENATION. 68 In ·this work the view was advanced that the Revised Statutes laid down two rules, one against
the suspension of the absolute power of alienation, the other against
remoteness of vesting. The fact that Mr. Chaplin's views have
gained recognition in the Court of Appeals of New York gives them
great significance. To make clear his position and the writer's comments upon it, it is necessary to quote the relevant sections of the
New York Revised Statutes :69
"Sec. 7. Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are
divided into estates in possession, ap.d estates in expectancy.
Sec. 8. An estate in possession, is where the owner has an immeuse of A and his heirs, but if B should die without heirs of his body, then to
the use of C and his heirs, the limitation to C and his heirs would be void,
as tending to a perpetuity. Yet C might, no doubt, release or pass his future
estate; and with the concurrence of the necessary parties, the fee-simple might
be disposed of, before there was a failure of issue of B. A perpetuity may,
with greater propriety, be defined to be a future limitation, restraining the
owner of the estate from aliening the fee-simple of the property, discharged
of such future use or estate, before the event is determined, or the period
arrived, when such future use or estate is to arise. If that event or period
be within the bounds prescribed by law, it is not a perpetuity." SANDERS,
EssAY ON UsitS AND TR.usTs, [4th ed.], vol. I, p. 1g6.
01
II5 Wis. 90, 109.
18
A second edition appeared in 1911•
.. The sections quoted are from Part II, Ch. I, Art. I.
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qiate right to the possession of the land. An estate. in expectancy, is
where the right to possession is postponed to a future period.
Sec. 9. Estates in expectancy, are divided into,
·I. Estates commencing at a future day, denominated futur~
estates; anci,.
2. Reversions.
Sec. 10. A future estate, is an estate limited to commence in possession at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent
estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a
precedent estate, created at the same time.
Sec. II. Where a future estate is dependent on a precedent estate,
it may be termed a remainder, and may be created and transferred
by that name.
Sec. 12. A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor
or his heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession
on the determination of a particular estate granted or devised.
Sec. 13. Future estates are either vested or contingent. They are
vested, when there is a· person in being, who would have an immediate right to the possession of the lands, upon the ceasing of the
intermediate or precedent estate. They are contingent, whilst the
person to whom, or the event upon which they are limited to take
effect; remains uncertain.
Sec. 14. Ever] future estate shall be void in its creation, which
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period
than is prescribed in this Article. Such power of alienation is sus~
pended, when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed.
Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation, shall not be suspended
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than
during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the
creation of the estate, except in the single case mentioned in the next
section.
Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee, may be created on a prior
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom
the first remainder is limited, shall die under the age of twenty-one
years, or upon any other contingency, by which the estate of such
persons may be determined before they attain their full age.
S~c. 17. Successive estates for life shall not be limited, unless to
persons in being at the creation thereof; and where a remainder shall
be limited on more than tw<> successive estates for life, all the life
estates subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled thereto,
shall be void, and upon the death e>f those persons, the remainder
shall take effect, in the same manner as if no other life estates had
been created.
Sec. 18. N <> remainder shall be created upon an estate for the
life of any e>ther person or persons than the grantee or devisee of
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such estate, unless such remainder be in fee; nor shall a remainder
be created upon ,such an estate in a term for years, unless it be for
the whole residue of such term.
Sec. 19. When a remainder shall be created upon any such life
estate, and more than two persons shall be named, as the persons
during whose lives the life estate shall continue, the remainder shall
take effect upon the death of the two persons first named, in the
same manner as if no other lives had been introduced.
Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term
of years, unless the nature of the contingency on wliich it is limited,
be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during the con~uance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of such
remainder, or upon the termination thereof.
Sec. 21. No estate for life, shall be limited as a remainder on a
term of years, except to a person in being, at the creation of such
estate.
Sec. 22. Where a remainder shall be limited to take effect on the
death of any person without heirs, or heirs of his body, or without
issue, the words "heirs" or "issue," shall be construed to mean heirs
or issue, living at the death of the person named as ancestor.
Sec. 23. All the provisions contained in this Article, relative to
{uture estates, shall be construed to apply to limitations of chattels
real as well as of freehold estates, so that the absolute ownership of
a term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than the
absolute power of alienatiop can be suspended, in respect to a fee.
Sec. 24- Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections
of this Article, a freehold estate as well as a chattel real, may be
created, to commence at a future day; an estate for life may be
created, in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon; a remainder of a freehold or chattel real, either contingent or vested,
may be created expectant on the determination of a term of years;
and a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a contingency, which, if it
should occur, must happen within the period prescribed in this
Article.
Sec. 25. Two or more future estates, may also be created, to take
effect in the alternative, so that if the first in order shall fail to vest,
the next in succession shall be substituted for it, and take effect
accordingly.
Sec. 26. No future estate, otherwise valid, shall be void on the
ground of the probability or improbability of the contingency on
which it is limited to take effect.
Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which, in
case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the precedent estate; and every suc::h remainder shall be construed a conditional limitation, and shall have the same effect as such a limitation
would have by law."
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Mr. Chaplin accepted the usual interpretation of sections 14 and
15, i. e., that they prohibit only a suspension of the absolute power
of alienatiqn and contain no prohibition against remoteness of vesting. 70 But he contended that as to 'remainders' the sections immediately succeeding those named together with section 16 established a
second rule, one against remoteness of vesting beyond the statutory
period.
For the purpose of examining the application of the rule against
remoteness of vesting, called by him Rule II, he divided 'remainders'
into three classes, according as they were limited upon estates for
years, for life, or in fee. 71 He found the source of his rule as applied to 'remainders' limited upon estates for years in sections 24
and 20 ;72 as applied to 'remainders' limited upon estates for lives in
sections 17, 18, and 19 ;73 and as applied to 'remainders' limited on
a fee, in sections 24 and 16.74
To the mind of the writer there is nothing in the form of the Revised Statutes, nor in the notes of the revisers, to justify this derivation of a rule against remoteness of vesting. Referring to the sections quoted above, it seems clear that they naturally arrange themselves into three groups. Sections 7 to 13 inclusive are definitive in
nature; sections 14 to 23 inclusive are restrictive; while sections 24
to 27 inclusive are permissive. Sections 14, 15, and 16 were intended to lay down a narrower rule against perpetuities than the
common law rule. Sections 14 and 15 restricted the common law
limit of 'lives in being' to 'two lives in being.' Section 16 though
permissive in form was intended also in a restrictive sense as it was
intended to limit the period of twenty years to the case of an actual
infancy. Sections 18 to 21 inclusive were intended to subject the
creation of specified future estates, some of which were not within
the prohibition of the common law rule, nor of the statutory rule,711
to r~strictions not existing at common law. These were in further"SusPSNSlON oF THI:: Pown o:F ALISNATION, Secs. 62-6.s.
n Ibid, Sec. 318.
n Ibid, Sec. 319.
n Ibid, Secs. 320-322.
"Ibid, Secs. 338-340. Criticism of the views presented by Mr. Chaplin
may be found in an article by Mr. George F. Canfield, "The New York ReTised Statutes and the Rule against Perpetuities," I Cor.. L. Rr:v. 224, 228.
" See particularly sections 17, 18, 19. and 21, where, under certain conditions, the creation of vested future estates is prohibited.
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ance of the general principle that the power of imposing restrictions
<>n the alienability of the fee by the creation of future estates should
be curtailed more than it had been at common faw. Section 23 subjected chattels rea1 to the provisions of the article in which the sections quoted are found, i. e., the article on the Creation and Division
of Estates.
Having imposed by these sections restrictions on the creation of
future· estates 1n favor .of public welfare, the revisers then sought l:o
abolish other restrictions previously existing not required by any
ntle of public policy, but restilting from technical rules of ..the common law, or at least to make clear that they no longer existed.75
Naturally they intended that the privileges thus granted or secured
should be subject to the restrictions ,Previously imposed and they.
sometimes specifically so provided.TT Thus in section 24 after providing that a fee might be limited on a fee, on a contingency, they
added "which, if it should occur, must happen within the period
prescribed in this Article."
It has been generally agreed or assumed that the qualification
added nothing in legal effect; that it only made express what would
otherwise have been implied. Still it does provide that the contingency upon which the second fee may be limited must occur within
the statutory period. This is in form a prohibition against remoteness of vesting. How can this be reconciled with the view that the
.statutory rule applies only to inalienable rather than to contingent
"Thus the following technical rules of the common law were expressly
abrogated by section 24; a freehold could not be limited to commence in the
future. TIFFANY, RsAr. PROPERTY, Sec. II9; Buckler v. Hardy, Cro. Eliz. 585.
An estate for life could not be created in a term of years and a remainder
limited thereon. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, Secs. 71a, 807, 808. A contingent remainder could not be created expectant upon a term of years. TIFFANY, RsAr.
PROPERTY, Sec. 123; CHAI.US, Rl;:Ar, PROPERTY, 93. A fee could not be limited
in derogation of a previously granted fee. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, Sec. ug.
n Section 17 provides that when a contingent remainder is limited on a
term of years it must vest in interest within :two lives. To the mind of the
writer such a case would have been covered by sections 14 and 15, had those
sections been construed as intended by the revisers, and such section was,
therefore, from their point of view, superfluous. But contingent remainders
could not be created on terms of years, at common law. The Revisers proposed to allow them to be so created, sec. 24- It was, therefore, natural that
they should specifically subject them to the rules applicable to· contingent remainders generally.
. ·
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i~terests? Those who adopt the view that the statutes provide a
rule against suspension of alienation only, such rule being found in
sections 14 to 16, either pass this provision over without comment
·or assume.that it refers merely to statutory rule as so understood.78
To the writer, who believes that sections 14 to 16 were intended to
lay down a rule against remoteness of vesting, it seems clear that
the provision merely refers t<;> the rule as intended to be established
by those sections. Mr. Chaplin however argued, as stated above,
that this provision was intended to establish a rule against remoteness of vesting of 'remainders' limited upon a fee, and with the other
sections, referred to above, relied upon by him established a general
rule against remoteness of 'remainders.'
Mr. Chaplin's rule against remoteness extended only to 'remainders'. This means remainders in the statutory sense, not in
the common law sense. Now remainders are nowhere defined in
the Revised .Statutes. This in itself is suggestive of the view that
the revisers did not intend anything to tum on the question whether
a certain future estate was or was not a remainder. However, they
used the term 'remainder' frequently in the statutes. And in section l l they provided : "Where a future estate is dependent on a
precedent estate, it may be termed a remainder, and may be created
and transferred by that name." It is apparent that, as so used, the
term "remainder" comprehends what were previously known as
vested remainders, ~ontingent remainders, shifting uses, and also
executory devises where, at least, the latter were limited in defeasance of another estate created by the same will. This leaves, of the
future estates as defined by the statutes, only what were previously
called springing uses and possibly such executory devises as are not
limited in defeasance of another estate limited by the same instrument. If 'remainder' as used in Mr. Chaplin's rule is to have the
same meaning as that here suggested, we have the absurdity of a
rule against the remoteness of vesting of shifting uses without haying a similar rule with respect to springing uses. This, apparently,

••FOWLER, REAI. PRoPI>RTY, 282; Rttws, ~AI. PRO~'l'Y, 622, n. a. See
George F. Canfield, "The New York Revised Statutes," 1 Cox.. L. J. 224, 300,
where the writer says that it would seem that the statute should be interpreted as though it read, "A fee may be limited upon a fee provided that it
does not occasion a suspension of the power of alienation beyond the period
prescribed in this article." See also instructive comment by Professor Edward H. Warren, 30 CYc. 1518, n. 81.
·
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led to the suggestion by Mr. Chaplin in the second edition of his
book that perhaps eventually the courts would apply this rule to all
future estates, either by analogy to the rule with respect to remainders or by so construing the statutes as to read 'remainders' as
synonymous with 'future estates'.79
·
In the Matter of Wilcox8° the Court of Appeals of New York
accepted Mr. Chaplin's .view. In that case personal property was
limited over upon an event that might occur at a more remote time
than two lives in being. The interest so limited was at all times
alienable. The New York statutes provide: "The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be suspended by any limitation
or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance and until the termination of not more than two lives in
being at the date of the instrument containing such limitation or
condition; or if such instrument be a will, for not more than two
lives in being at the death of the testator. 81
"In all other respects, limitations of future or contingent interests
in personal property shall he subject to the rules prescribed in the
first Chapter of this Act, in relation to future estates in land."82
The court held that, in determining whether or not an alienable
executory limitation in personal property suspended the absolute
ownership of personal property, it was necessary, in view of the
above statute, to determine whether or not the statutes contained a
rule against remoteness of vesting, as, "if it were established that
the sole statutory restriction on the power to create estates in realty
was that the creation of such estates shall not suspend the absolute
powers of alienation beyond the prescribed period, there would be
force in the position that the absolute ownership of personal property
was not suspended when there were persons in being, no matter in
what manner or what the nature of their interests, who acting conjointly could transfe: an indefeasible title." 83
It determined that there was to be found in the statutes relating
to real estate a rule against remoteness of vesting. The argument
of the court is as follows: The common law rule was a rule against
,. SusPENSION oF AutNATION, [2nd: ed.], Secs. 304-305.
,,, 194 N. Y. 288.
81
Ri::v. ST., Part II, Ch. IV, Title IV, sec. I.
"'Rev. ST., Pt. II, Ch. IV, ~it. IV, sec. 2.
83
194 N. Y. 288, 300.
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remoteness. The statutory ruJe found in sections I4 and IS is a
rule against suspension only. The revisers were men of great
erudition, and it must be supposed that they understood the common
law rule, and, therefore, knew that sections I4 and IS established
a different rule. Section I7 prohibiting the creation of successive
life estates to more than two persons in being showed that, at least
in this respect,_ limitations on the power to create future estates
other than the provision that they should not suspend the power of
alienation were intended.
Sections IS to 24 inclusive with their elaborate and minute restrictio!ls on the creation of remainders were impossible to understand if the revisers intended to establish the smgle rule that the
power of alienation should not be suspended for more than two
lives in being. Particularly is this true of Section 24. The court
says: "Section 24, already quoted, concludes, 'and a fee may be
limited on a fee, upon a contingency, which, if it should occur, must
happen within the period prescribed in this Article,' i. e. within two
lives in being. This statutory authority for lirriJting a fee upon a
fee is necessarily exclusive; othenvise, why should the statute declare that the contingency must occur within the specified period?
It has no necessary connection with the provision restricting the
suspension of the power of alienation. It is u~der this provision
that the present case would fall if it were real estate."8 i
The case of Matter of Wilco% is obviously revolutionary. 85 The
rule against suspension of alienation had varied from the common
law Rule against Perpetuities in two significant respects. It forbade
the creation of inalienable present estates, where such inalienability
might exceed two lives in being, while it permitted the creation of
alienable contingent future estates at however remote a period they
might vest. Matter of Wilco% now establishes a. rule against the
remoteness of vesting of 'remainders' even though alienable, which,
because of the limit to two lives in being, is more stringent than the
common law rule.
The rule laid down in Matter of Wilco% has been followed recently by the New York Court of Appeals and applied to a future
estate which can not be called a 'remainder' except as 'remainder'
"194 N. Y. 288, -299.

See case commented on in Fowr.~s ReAL PROP.£R'tY LAW, [3rd ed.],
276-289; 22 HARV. L. ~v. 543; 9 Cor,. L. ~v. 368.
85
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may be construed to include all future estates. The case referred
to is Walker v. Marcellus & Otisco Lake Railway Co. 88 In this
case the grantor. conveyed, in effect, as construed, an estate in fee
to take effect whenever she, the grantor, should cease to occupy a
certain lime kiln upon the premises, and to use the same .for the
purpose of burning lime. She had ceased to use the lime kiln, and
the assignee of the grantee being in possession sought to hold possession by virtue of the limitation in the deed. 87 The court repeated
the substance of the argument of Matter of Wilcoz as follows:
"The revisers, however, had something more in mind at
least with regard to certain future estates than merely the
prohibition of restrictions on alienation. As an illustration
a remainder might not be limited on more than two successive
life estates. They well knew that every executory device or
springing use was then required to be so limited that the contingency upon which they depended must happen within a
time measured by lives. They were aware of the definition
of a springing use; that-it depended on no prior estate. Yet
they intended to cover the entire ground as to the creation
and division of estates. Their design was to simplify, not to
complicate, the transfer of real estate-to restrict, not to
extend, the limitations which a grantor might impose upon it.
With all this in mind they provided that a freehold estate
might be created to commence at a future day and that a
fee may be limited on a fee on a contingency which must
occur, if ever, within a time measured by lives."88
It then proceeded to deny the validity of any distinction between
"remainders" and other future estates respecting the question of
remoteness of vesting in the following language:
"Technically a springing use, or what is now its equivalent, does not come withi!l this definition. It does come within its object and purpose. Had the determinable fee been
.. 226 N. Y. 347.
87
The facts were that the original grantee had entered upon the land before the assignment and destroyed the kiln. The court below held that the
grantee or its assigns could not take advantage of a discontinuance of use
caused by the grantee itself. 179 App. Div. (N. Y.) j13.
·
83
226 N. Y. 349.
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granted, not excepted, no question would arise. It is inconceivable that the revisers intended to make a distinttion between t~vo classes of cases, the effect of which is substantially
ideu'tical. It must be that in speaking of a fee limited on a
fee they had not in mind the technical distinction of the early
conveyancers. They were considering future estates and
their desire was that when such estates depended upon a contingency they should vest in possession within a reasonable
period. Their language should, therefore, be so construed as
to carry out their intention. When they speak of a fee
limited on a fee in this connection they refer to the grant of
any future fee which may arise on a contingency which limits
a prior fee however such result is brought about." 8 Q
That the views taken by the New York court in these cases will
be followed by those states which have adopted the New York Real
Property Code seems hardly likely, yet seems no more unlikely than
that New York would do so seemed a few years ago. Some of the
statutory provisions especially relied upon by the New York court
are, however, not found in all of such states, so there is to this extent less reason to be found by them for adopting the New York
rule against remoteness. 90
Under the law as it now stands in New York, assuming that the
cases referred to represent the present state of the law, the effect is
to render the statute prohibiting a suspension of the power of alienation chiefly effective in invalidating trusts, which in tum have been
.. 2z6 N. Y. 350.
"'This is particularly true of that part of section 24 of the New York
Revised Statutes especially relied upon in the Matter of \Vilcox, i. e., the
provision that, "a fee may be limited on a fee, on a contingency, which, if it
should occur must happen within the period prescribed in this article." This
provision appears in the section corresponding to section 24 of the New York
Revised Statutes in the states of California (CIVIL Cone, Sec. 773), Montana
(I REVISED ConEs, Sec. 4493), North Dakota, (I COMPILED LAWS, Sec. 5316),
and South Dakota (CIVIL Cone, Sec. 253). It has been omitted from the
corresponding sections in the states of Arizona (CIVIL Cons, Sec. 4689), Indiana (2 BunN's ANN. STS., Sec. 3995), Michigan (COMPILED LAWS, Sec. II,
542), !\iinnesota, (GENERAL STATUTES, Sec. 6674), and \Visconsin (\V1scoNSIN
STATUTES, Sec. 2048), while Oklahoma (GENERAL STATUTES, Sec. 5437), omits
that part requiring that the contingency, "if it should occur, must happen
within the period prescribed in this Article."
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made inalienable by statute. It is to be hoped that if in other jurisdictions we are to have a rule against remoteness- of vesting from
the statutes, it will be found in sections prohibiting suspension of
the power of alienation rather than in the sections relied upon by the
New York courts, and, if so found, that it will be determined that
it is the only rule to be found in the statutes.
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